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ABSTRACT
While size asymmetry (e.g., large buyer and small supplier) has been
discussed in a no-disruption operation context (Lee & Johnson, 2012), little is
known whether, how buyers react differently when different-sized suppliers cause
different types of disruptions. Extant research suggests in a supplier-induced
disruption supplier’s recovery actions yield various effects in a size-unbalancing
setting, indicating a need for a deeper understanding of what buyers prefer in order
to resolve disruptions caused by facing different sized suppliers and the rationales
behind the decisions. Accordingly, this dissertation examines whether and how the
supplier size and supplier-induced disruption type impact on commitment (i.e.,
enduring desire to maintain the relationship) as well as buyers’ preferred use of
mediated power (i.e., use of extrinsic motivation to influence the target party) in
Essay 1, and provides an extensive overview of the literature and a future research
agenda on size asymmetry in the buyer-supplier relationship in Essay 2.
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INTRODUCTION
Dissertation Overview
A supply chain represents a network of all the member organizations or
individuals and consists of the flows of products, services, information, and
finances through upstream and downstream links (Mentzer, DeWitt, Keebler, Min,
Nix, & Smith, 2001). One of the critical elements in managing a supply chain is
managing interorganizational relationships (Mentzer et al., 2001). Across various
business

research

settings,

practical

and

academic,

interorganizational

relationships have received significant attention and been examined with a large
number of theories and methods employed. However, empirical studies assessing
interorganizational relationships under disrupted and asymmetrical situations are
still limited (Lee & Johnson, 2011; Cheng, Craighead, Wang, & Li, 2019). Given its
nature of complexity and dynamics, a supply chain does not always function as
planned or anticipated. When an unplanned and unanticipated event disrupts a
supply chain, it may endanger the related firms with operational, financial, and
relational risks (Craighead, Blackhurst, Rungtusanatham, & Handfield, 2007).
This dissertation focuses on buyer-supplier relationships particularly under
disruption and essay 1 specifically involves in supplier-induced disruptions, which
is when the suppliers are responsible for the disruptions. Supplier-induced
disruptions occur frequently and lead to different consequences to the buyersupplier relationships. Apple watch production experienced a defective issue and
a consequential delay resulting from the key components from one of two suppliers
1

(Wakabayashi & Luk, 2015), and Tesla’s first U.S. based fatal crash was related
to its camera issue embedded in the Autopilot system provided by one of its largest
sensor suppliers (Higgins, 2016). In these two cases, Apple kept the relationship
with the supplier whereas Tesla ended the partnership. Little is understood what
the elements are contributing to various perceptions and resolutions in different
type of supplier-induced disruption. Empirical evidence suggests that different
disruptions are attributed to different causes of the event and result in different
levels of trust loss (Kim, Dirks, Cooper & Ferrin, 2004). These findings encourage
us to understand the impact of different disruptions on other perceptions of the
buyers and preferred resolutions. Furthermore, supplier size has been examined
as a critical factor in interorganizational relationships research with its implication
of power and dependence (Gulati & Sytch, 2007; Handley & Benton, 2012). It will
be critical to see the role of supplier size in a supplier-induced disruption and how
the buyers, the victim, react differently. In summary, this dissertation focuses on
contributing to interorganizational relationship research by exploring the effects of
supplier-induced disruption on buyer’s behavioral actions in consideration of
supplier size (essay 1) and synthesizing the literature on size asymmetry,
highlighting the future research path for buyer-supplier relationship scholars
(essay 2).
Essay 1 (Chapter I) examines the effects of integrity- and competencebased supplier-induced disruption on large buyer’s commitment with large and
small suppliers. By employing scenario-based experiments, we identify that large
buyers react with lower commitment to the suppliers when experiencing an
2

integrity-based disruption than a competence-based disruption. The findings
further suggest that a larger buyer perceives higher commitment and more use of
mediated power when facing a larger supplier compare with a small supplier.
Moreover, a larger buyer shows more willingness to use the mediated power with
a larger supplier than a smaller supplier through its commitment.
Essay 2 (Chapter II) explores the research on size asymmetry in buyersupplier relationships. Firm size’s role in an inter-organizational relationship has
been examined with various types of measurement adopted, giving scholars many
opportunities to expand the field. An overview of the literature includes what
studies offer in terms of research agenda opportunities for scholars to enhance the
body of knowledge with an emphasis on incorporating supply chain disruptions.
A brief literature review of supplier-induced disruptions is provided in the
next section, followed by discussions concerning the types of disruption, size
asymmetry, and power in buyer-supplier relationship areas.

Supplier-induced Disruption Literature Review
Supply chain disruptions, defined as unplanned product flow delays or
stoppages (Craighead et al., 2007), can be negatively related to operational
outcomes (Stauffer, 2003; Hendricks & Singhal, 2005a), shareholder wealth
(Hendricks & Singhal, 2003), and other financial performance (Hendricks &
Singhal, 2005b). This dissertation focuses on supplier-induced disruptions, which
is when the suppliers are responsible for the disruptions. Supply chain researchers
have established a substantial body of knowledge regarding supply chain
3

disruptions (Craighead et al., 2007; Hendricks & Singhal, 2005a, 2005b;
Lumineau, Eckerd, & Handley, 2015), and started switching their attention to
supplier-induced disruptions (Cheng et al., 2019; Kaufmann, Esslinger, & Carter,
2018; Reimann, Kosmol, & Kaufmann, 2017; Wang, Craighead, & Li, 2014).
Across most studies in supplier-induced disruptions, trust (i.e., firm belief in the
reliability, truth, ability, or strength of the other party) is measured as a primary
indicator of the effect of the disruptions (Dirks, Kim, Ferrin & Cooper, 2011;
Kaufmann et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2014). Although trust contributes to a
significant part of the buyer-supplier relationship, there is a need to expand to other
behavioral actions in supplier-induced disruptions research.
Integrity- and Competence-based Disruption
The type of disruption is considered a critical factor that can alter
interorganizational relationships in supply chain disruptions. This dissertation looks
at two types of disruptions pertaining to the buyer-supplier exchange perspective:
integrity- and competence-based disruptions. Two types of disruptions are
distinguished by their causes of the event. Integrity-based disruptions are defined
as suppliers breaching the values, principles, and social orders (Kim, Dirks,
Cooper, & Ferrin, 2004). Competence-based disruptions are defined as the
supplier’s lack of knowledge and technical skills (Kim et al. 2004).
Integrity- and competence-based disruptions are identified from the
disruptions of the two well-established dimensions of trust in interorganizational
relationships: competence- and integrity-based trust, because competence and
4

integrity represent two of the critical factors of trustworthiness (Butler & Cantrell,
1984; Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006; Janowicz-Panjaitan & Krishnan, 2009;
Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). Suggested from the schematic model from
Reeder and Brewer (1979), there might be inherent differences lying in people’s
assessment of the information delivered from competence and integrity
disruptions. Extant research suggests that individuals tend to overweigh the
negative information about integrity disruption (Dirks et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2006).
Moreover, people consider an honest act as a discounted signal of honesty,
whereas a dishonest act is perceived as a more reliable signal of dishonesty,
therefore low integrity (Dirks et al. 2011; Kim, Diekmann, & Tenbrunsel, 2003; Kim
et al., 2006). As a result, an integrity disruption as a critical indicator of low integrity,
in general, leads to a more substantial impact on trust loss compared to a
competence disruption (Dirks, Lewicki, & Zaheer, 2009).
Trust disruptions may not only violate trust. The individuals exposed to the
context assess the negative information and form their perceptions and actions,
following a dispositional attribution process (Kim et al., 2006; Reeder & Brewer,
1979). Trust loss and trust repair have received substantial attention in
interorganizational exchange disruptions (Kaufmann et al., 2018; Kim et al., 2004;
Kim et al., 2006;) whereas another critical indicator of the relationship,
commitment, has been largely overlooked in a disruption context. Commitment is
defined as one party’s desire to maintain the relationship and is considered central
to contributing to social exchange beyond economic business (Anderson & Weitz,
1992; Cook & Emerson, 1978; Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Thus, a gap lies in
5

expanding our understanding of the effects of supplier-induced disruptions on
other perceptions and behavioral actions.
Size Asymmetry
Size asymmetry is defined as an imbalance in the size of an interorganizational relationship, based on the number of employees of the entire
organization (Johnsen & Ford, 2008). In this dissertation, we distinguish the firm
size based on the threshold suggested by Small Business Administration. SBA
demonstrates that 100 is the lowest small business size standard in the number of
employees matched to industries described in the North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS) (SBA, Small Business Size Regulations, 2019). On
the other side of the spectrum, the largest firm size category falls at 5,000 and
more for all industries listed in NAICS (SBA, Small Business Size Regulations,
2021). To make the distinction between the large and small firm more salient, we
chose the number of employees of 50 and 10,000 to describe for the small and
large firms. Among other asymmetric characteristics of a relationship, size
asymmetry simplifies the complexity of the interorganizational relationship. It has
been found associated with other relationship characteristics, such as mutuality,
conflict, interpersonal inconsistency, intensity, power, and dependence (Lee &
Johnson, 2012; Ford & Saren, 2001; Gulati & Sytch, 2007; Gundlach, Achrol, &
Mentzer, 1995). Moreover, how size asymmetry impacts on opportunism and
performance in buyer-supplier relationships has been examined (Villena &
Craighead, 2017). Prior studies (Johnson & Ford, 2008; Lee & Johnson, 2012)
6

primarily focus on one type of the size asymmetric relationship (e.g. larger buyers
and smaller suppliers) while all the degree and directions of the size asymmetry
are included and studied from both parties (Villena & Craighead, 2017). However,
both parties' wide-range behavioral actions on how they perceive and manage this
asymmetric relationship are left unknown.
To date, the studies on size asymmetry in the buyer-supplier relationship
still focus on the relationship when operating under the normal modes. It is
essential for firms to achieve a transparent view of their potential and ability by
understanding the nature and influences of a size asymmetric relationship (Lee &
Johnson, 2012; Ford & Saren, 2011), but It will be even more critical and
informative to understand whether and how firms within a size asymmetric
relationship perceive and react differently under a disruption scenario. In this
dissertation, the role of size asymmetry in buyer-supplier relationship is explored
under a supplier-induced disruption situation.
Power
In this dissertation, we adopted the definition of power: “the ability of one
individual or group to control or influence the behavior of another” (Hunt and Nevin,
1974, p. 186). Power dynamics have been discussed in the body of knowledge on
buyer-supplier disruptions in mitigating the negative consequences or moderating
the effects (Handley & Benton, 2012; Lumineau & Malhotra, 2011). Two
dimensions of power have been conceptualized in the literature: mediated power
and unmediated power (Maloni & Benton, 2000). Mediated power is defined as
7

coercive, reward, and legitimate power bases; unmediated power is defined as
expert and referent power (Benton & Maloni, 2005). Firms cannot deliberately exert
the unmediated power and influence another party, whereas firms can administer
the mediated power to influence the target (Benton & Malonti, 2005). Given its
actionable nature, mediated power is often adopted by firms and examined in the
research. Interestingly, substantial evidence suggests that utilizing mediated
power hurts the quality of interorganizational relationships (Handley & Benton,
2012b) with reduced satisfaction (Hunt & Nevin, 1974), less commitment (Brown,
Lusch, & Nicholson, 1995), and reduced operational agreements (Frazier &
Summers, 1984). It’s been missing that how would the firms who possess the
mediated power prefer (or not) to exert power in a supplier-induced disruption. Key
constructs definitions are summarized in table 1.
Essay 1 and Essay 2 are presented in Chapter I and Chapter II of this
dissertation. Each essay includes one independent study. The dissertation
concludes with Chapter IV, a brief section that consolidates both studies' findings
and proposes a future research path.

8

CHAPTER I - ESSAY 1 – BUYER’S PERCEPTION OF SUPPLIERINDUCED DISRUPTIONS BY LARGE VERSUS SMALL FIRMS

9

Abstract
While size asymmetry (i.e., large buyer and small supplier) has been
discussed in a no-disruption operation context (Lee & Johnson, 2012), it is unclear
whether and how a large buyer reacts differently when different-sized suppliers
cause different types of disruptions. Extant research suggests in a supplierinduced disruption, supplier’s recovery actions are less effective when the supplier
is more dependent on the buyer (Cheng et al., 2019), indicating a need for deeper
understanding of what buyers prefer in order to resolve disruptions caused by
facing different sized suppliers. Accordingly, we examine the effect of supplier size
and supplier-induced disruption type on commitment (i.e., enduring desire to
maintain the relationship) as well as buyers’ preferred use of mediated power (i.e.,
use of extrinsic motivation to influence the target party). Grounded in commitmenttrust theory, our test examines the key mediating role of commitment in interorganizational relationships in supplier-induced disruptions. Conducting scenariobased experiments, we find that a large buyer is more committed to a large supplier
than to a small supplier in a supplier-induced disruption. Interestingly, a large buyer
prefers to use mediated power strategies with a large supplier than with a small
one. Commitment is found to mediate the effect of supplier size and mediated
power, particularly with reward and monitor strategies. Although the interaction of
supplier size and disruption type does not impact commitment or mediated power,
integrity disruption damages buyer commitment more than competence disruption
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does. Moreover, only in an integrity disruption does supplier size significantly
impact the buyer's preference for using a reward strategy.

Introduction
A large buying firm tends to have a complex supply chain consisting of a
network of diversified supply organizations (Johnsen & Ford, 2008). Managing
relationships with all kinds of suppliers is critical to managing supply chains. As
dynamic and complex as a supply chain can be, disruptions (i.e., unplanned
stoppage or delays in a supply chain flow) frequently occur. A supplier-induced
disruption can lead to devastating effects, even termination of the existing buyersupplier relationship (Mir, Aloysius, & Eckerd, 2017). It is critical to understand how
buying firms perceive and react to supplier-induced disruptions. It is unclear how
large buyers perceive the relationship when facing large versus small suppliers in
a supplier-induced disruption.
Small businesses are emerging and contributing to the U.S. economy.
Organizations with fewer than 250 employees account for 95% of the nonfarm
companies in the United States and more than half of all U.S. manufacturing
employees (Arend 2006; Beekman & Robinson 2004; U.S. Bureau of the Census
2018). Supply chain researchers have examined the selection decisions and
evaluation of both large and small suppliers (Pearson & Ellram, 1995) as well as
the significant effects of size asymmetry (i.e., large buyers and small suppliers;
small buyers and large suppliers) on inter-organizational relationships (Johnsen &
Ford, 2008; Lee & Johnsen, 2012; Villena & Craighead, 2017). Specifically,
11

researchers have identified supplier size’s effects on buyer-supplier relationships
from small suppliers’ perspectives (Johnson & Ford, 2008) or from both small
suppliers’ and large buyers’ perspectives (Lee & Johnson, 2012). However,
researchers’ discussions tend to be limited to no-disruption circumstances. Given
the supplier size’s critical role in buyer-supplier relationships, it is unclear in a
disruption scenario how large buyers perceive the relationship and whether they
react differently when facing different-sized suppliers.
Firm size asymmetry implies the existence of power and dependence,
which matters in coping with supplier-induced disruptions. Suppliers’ recovery
actions are less effective when the supplier is more dependent on the buyer
(Cheng, Craighead, Wang, & Li, 2019). Suppliers’ recovery actions are active
initiatives, which are passive for buyers. It would be valuable to identify buyer’s
preferences for adopting strategies in a supplier-induced incident. When facing a
small supplier, a large buyer can exert external influence (i.e., mediated power) on
the small supplier. Therefore, we focus on using mediated power as a buyer’s
preferred resolution in supplier-induced disruptions. This research addresses how
the buying firm (i.e., the victim) perceives the situation and which strategies are
preferred for dealing with the supplier.
Shaping our conceptual model, our theoretical framework aligns with the
key mediating variable model from the commitment-trust theory (CTT). When the
supplier causes a disruption, the buyer suffers and may reassess the relationship
with the supplier. When dealing with different-sized suppliers, a large buyer faces
various levels of relationship termination costs, switching difficulties, and benefits
12

(Whitten & Wakefield, 2006; Farrell & Shapiro, 1988). A large supplier can provide
to a large buyer more relationship benefits, higher relationship termination costs,
and more switching difficulties than to a small supplier (Whitten & Wakefield, 2006;
Farrell & Shapiro, 1988; Weiss & Anderson, 1992). CTT suggests that higher
relationship termination costs and more relationship benefits lead to higher
relationship commitment (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). It is unknown whether these
factors still hold in a supplier-induced disruption.
At the CTT’s core is the key mediating role of commitment, defined as one
party's desire to develop and maintain a long-term relationship with another party
(Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Morgan & Hunt, 1994). We propose that the buyer's
preference for using a mediated power strategy serves as a potential outcome and
that commitment mediates supplier size and the mediated power strategy in a
supplier-induced disruption. Mediated power strategy is defined as the use of
extrinsic motivation to exert influence on the target party (Brown, Lusch, &
Nicholson, 1995; Handley & Banton, 2012). By examining various types of
disruptions, we introduced various causes of the disruptions to examine supplier
size’s effects. To examine our conceptual framework, we conducted scenariobased experiments with 266 MTurk workers who have working experience in the
supply chain area.
This dissertation contributes to the literature and practice in several ways.
First, contrary to our hypothesis derived from extant research (Handley & Benton,
2012), we find large buyers prefer to exert mediated power on large suppliers
rather than on small ones, providing boundary conditions in using mediated power.
13

Second, while commitment-trust theory and commitment’s mediating role have
been examined in buyer-supplier relationships (Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Wu, Weng,
& Huang, 2012), we propose a potential antecedent, a moderator, and an outcome
in the CTT model and test it in a disruption context. Third, although the disruption
type does not interact with supplier size, commitment’s mediating effect is only
salient with the integrity disruption, which enhances the effect’s boundary
conditions. Finally, our results provide implications for (a) buyers as they design
their supply base and precautionary plans and (b) suppliers as they effectively
communicate with buyers in coping with a supplier-induced disruption.

Literature Review
Large Buyer Facing Large and Small Suppliers
A large buyer tends to have a diversified supply base with varying supplier
sizes based on the organization's number of employees (Johnsen & Ford, 2008).
It is critical to understand the role of supplier size in order to effectively manage
buyer-supplier relationships (Adams, Khoja, & Kauffman, 2012). Among a
relationship's other characteristics, supplier size simplifies the inter-organizational
relationship's complexity and implies various facets of the supplier's attributes.
Supplier size has been associated with other relationship characteristics, such as
mutuality, conflict, interpersonal inconsistency, intensity, switching costs,
termination costs, power, and dependence (Farrell & Shapiro, 1988; Gulati &
Sytch, 2007; Gundlach, Achrol, & Mentzer, 1995; Lee & Johnsen, 2012; Ford &
Saren, 2001; Weiss & Anderson, 1992;). Small suppliers tend to heavily depend
14

on large buyers; therefore, large buyers perceive small suppliers as their power
targets with lower switching costs compared to large suppliers (Weiss & Anderson,
1992). Supplier size’s effect on the inter-organizational relationship has been
primarily examined under normal operations in which no disruptions occur. When
the supplier causes a disruption, the buyer reassesses the cause and the current
relationship. Though the negative effect on the buyer-supplier relationship is
almost certain, it is less clear whether the small and large suppliers share the same
level of blame. It is interesting to explore whether the large buyer tends to be more
comprehensive with higher commitment and less use of mediated power or less
tolerant with small versus large suppliers.
Integrity- and Competence-based Disruptions
The disruption type is a critical factor, which can alter inter-organizational
relationships in supply chain disruptions. This dissertation identifies both integrityand competence-based disruptions of the buyer-supplier exchange. Integritybased disruptions are defined as suppliers breaching values, principles, and social
orders while competence-based disruptions result from suppliers’ lack of
knowledge and technical skills (Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006).
In inter-organizational relationships, integrity- and competence-based
disruptions are identified among those of the two well-established dimensions of
trust (i.e., competence- and integrity-based), representing two critical factors of
trustworthiness (Butler & Cantrell, 1984; Kim et al., 2006; Janowicz-Panjaitan &
Krishnan, 2009; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). Based on the schematic
15

model in Reeder and Brewer's (1979) study, there might be inherent differences in
people's assessment of information related to competence and integrity
disruptions. Extant research suggests that individuals tend to overemphasize
integrity disruptions’ negative details (Dirks, Kim, Ferrin, & Cooper, 2011; Kim et
al., 2006). Moreover, people tend to assume that high-integrity parties do not
behave dishonestly no matter what the circumstances. In contrast, low-integrity
parties may display honest or dishonest behaviors. Therefore, people consider a
righteous act a discounted signal of honesty, whereas a dishonest act is perceived
as a more reliable signal of dishonesty and low integrity (Dirks et al., 2011; Kim et
al., 2006).
Power Bases
Power is defined as the ability of one party to influence the target party and
has been widely discussed in buyer-supplier relationship management (Hunt &
Nevin, 1974; Huo, Flynn & Zhao, 2017; Reimann & Ketchen, 2017) and has been
suggested to have mixed effects on buyer-supplier relationships (Caniel &
Geldermann, 2007; Zhao, Huo, Flynn, & Yeung, 2008). If in a normal operation, a
large buyer hesitates to influence or control suppliers, a supplier-induced
disruption would provide a legitimate reason for the buyers to reinforce and guard
their benefits. In tackling supply chain disruptions, extant research mainly focuses
on power-balanced scenarios and has called for future research on imbalanced
distribution of power (Kaufmann et al., 2018). Cheng et al. (2019) found that when
a supplier is more dependent on the buyer, the less effective the supplier’s
16

recovery actions are (Cheng et al., 2019). This impact may result from lack of
understanding which repair strategies buying firms prefer to use with differentsized suppliers. Two power dimensions have been conceptualized in the literature:
mediated and unmediated power (Maloni & Benton, 2000; Benton & Maloni, 2005).
Mediated power depends on coercive, reward, and legitimate bases; unmediated
power consists of referent and expert power (Benton & Maloni, 2005). Firms
cannot deliberately exert unmediated power and influence another party, whereas
firms can exercise mediated ability to control another party (Benton & Malonti,
2005). Given its actionable nature, mediated power is frequently adopted by firms
and examined in the research.
This dissertation focuses mainly on the buyer's use of mediated power; the
omni construct; and the individual bases: reward, coercive, and legal legitimate
(Benton & Malonti, 2005). Reward power is defined as the buyer's ability to reward
the supplier as promised when the supplier complies. Coercive (or penalties)
power is the buyer's ability to punish the supplier if failing to meet the agreed upon
requirements. Legal, legitimate power is defined as contracts and other legal
agreements specifying the supplier’s obligations. Studies suggest that mediated
power bases tend to be implemented collectively instead of separately (Raven &
Kruglanski, 1970; Handley & Benton, 2012). In their seminal work, French and
Raven (1959) discussed the difficulty of distinguishing between reward and
coercive power. For example, an additional bonus is promised to the supplier if he
can meet the requirement; that bonus is considered a reward. However,
withholding the bonus if the supplier cannot meet the buyer’s requirement may be
17

perceived as coercion (French & Raven, 1959; Handley & Benton, 2012).
Furthermore, empirical studies suggest that reward, coercive, and legal legitimate
power bases are employed jointly (Brown et al., 1995; Frazier & Summers, 1984;).
In the current study, we describe a scenario to distinguish between reward and
coercion not only to avoid missing individual effects but also to include mediated
power’s omni construct in order to identify the joint effects (Handley & Benton,
2012). Therefore, we hypothesize that individual bases' effects would lead to
positive or negative effects as a joint construct, and we explore those individual
effects. Supplier-induced disruptions are multi-faceted in inter-organizational
exchanges, thereby impacting the relationship at varying levels under varying
circumstances.

Theoretical Background and Hypotheses Development
This research draws on the premise that the commitment-trust theory (CTT)
is critical to the supplier size’s impact on buyer-supplier relationships in a supplierinduced disruption. CTT highlights the key mediating role of commitment and trust
in an inter-organizational relationship (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Researchers either
consider both trust and commitment as key mediators (Morgan & Hunt, 1994) or
treat each one as a critical construct in the relational exchange (Doney & Cannon,
1997; Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Jap & Ganesan, 2000). Within the original key
mediating variable (KMV) model proposed in Morgan and Hunt (1994),
antecedents include relationship termination costs, shared values, relationship
benefits, communication, and opportunistic behavior. Outcomes consist of
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acquiescence, propensity to leave, cooperation, functional conflict, and decisionmaking uncertainty. The KMV model has been empirically examined in a supply
chain study involving an ordinary (i.e., no disruption) context (Wu, Weng, & Huang,
2012). In a disruption scenario, trust has been widely used as the central construct
of interest (Esslinger et al., 2019). Commitment, another key mediator, is
considered central to contributing to social exchange beyond economic business
(Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Cook & Emerson, 1978; Morgan & Hunt, 1994); yet, it
is discussed primarily in a non-disruption context.
In this study, we focus on commitment’s critical mediating role not only in a
negative event context but also within a power-imbalanced setting (see Figure 1).
A supplier-induced disruption provides the buyer with negative details about the
supplier, thus giving the buyer reasons to reassess the relationship with a reduced
level of willingness in order to maintain the relationship (Mir et al., 2016).
Therefore, we posit that a supplier-induced disruption would negatively impact a
buyer's commitment.
Supplier size reflects the level of dependence differentials and associated
switching costs. An undefined element of termination costs (Morgan and Hunt,
1994), switching costs include perceived economic costs (Jones, Mothersbaugh,
& Beatty, 2002), benefit loss costs, brand relationship loss costs, monetary loss
costs (Burnham, Frels, & Mahajan, 2003; Whitten & Wakefield, 2006), and
perceived time and effort (Jones et al., 2002). Dealing with a large supplier, a large
buyer perceives greater associated costs involved in terminating the exchange
relationship and switching to another large supplier. In contrast, terminating the
19

relationship with a small supplier and switching to another small supplier would
cost the large buyer less time, effort, and money. Higher termination and switching
costs involved with a large supplier contribute to greater switching difficulty and the
large buyer’s increased dependence, and vice versa. In a supplier-induced
disruption, buyers as the victims naturally have a legitimate reason to assert their
rights. When supplier switching difficulties are lower, buying firms seek
opportunities to exert power to influence the supplier in buyer-favored directions
(Handley & Benton, 2012). Therefore, when facing a large supplier, a large buyer
would prefer to use less mediated power than when facing a small supplier
(Handley & Benton, 2012).
H1. A large buyer prefers to use less mediated power— coercive, legal
legitimate, and reward strategies—with a large supplier than with a small supplier.

Rather than supplier size differential directly affecting the use of mediated
power as proposed in Hypothesis 1, the relationship between supplier size and
mediated power is arguably a function of the commitment’s impact. As previously
discussed, supplier size influences termination and switching costs. A large buyer
uses the magnitude of these costs to assess the relationship’s importance, thus
determining the relationship commitment (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Aligning with
CTT, supplier size is associated with relationship termination costs and
relationship benefits, which are key antecedents and positively related to
commitment (Morgan & Hunt. 1994).
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Aligning CTT, commitment serves as a key mediator in an interorganizational relationship. Specifically, in the CTT’s KMV model, relationship
commitment is negatively correlated with the propensity to leave (i.e., the likelihood
to terminate the relationship) (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). The propensity to leave,
perceived as a level of instability, represents a costly performance outcome. In a
supplier-induced disruption, mediated power as a preferred resolution strategy can
be considered a potential outcome of a supplier-induced disruption as a result of
the buyer's commitment to the supplier.
H2. A large buyer's preference for mediated power— coercive, legal
legitimate, and reward strategies—is mediated by the buyer’s commitment to the
supplier.
In this dissertation, we focus on two types of disruption: integrity- and
competence-based

(hereafter,

expressed

as

integrity

and

competence

disruptions). Integrity disruptions are related to the supplier’s values and principles,
whereas competence disruptions are due to a lapse in skill and performance.
Based on the supplier-induced disruption’s cause, large buyers analyze the
rationale behind the disruption and reassess the exchange relationship with the
supplier. Competence disruptions are perceived as indicators of the supplier’s
competence level (Reeder & Brewer, 1979). Thus, the buyer believes that the
supplier with greater ability will be able to perform competently, while the supplier
with less ability will perform less competently (Dirks et al., 2011). Conversely,
buyers not only attribute the integrity disruption’s cause to the supplier's low
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integrity and questionable values and principles but also perceive that the supplier
will be dishonest (Dirks et al., 2011). Thus, this disruption will happen again when
the supplier deems it necessary. As a critical indicator of low integrity that generally
leads to damaging the buyer’s trust in the supplier, integrity disruption—in contrast
to competence disruption—will, in turn, diminish the buyer’s commitment to the
supplier and substantially deteriorate the relationship (Dirks, Lewicki, & Zaheer,
2009).
Given the nature of competence and integrity disruptions, the buyer’s trust
in and, thus, commitment to the supplier are damaged differently. If a supplierinduced disruption motivates the large buyer to exert power, the buyer will have a
stronger motivation to exert mediated power when faced with integrity disruptions
because the buyer will perceive such disruptions as evidence of the supplier’s
dishonesty, lower integrity, and untrustworthiness. In contrast, the buyer would
perceive the supplier as less capable in a competence disruption and, therefore,
be less motivated to exert power over the supplier. Thus, we posit the following:
H3a. Integrity disruption diminishes the commitment of a large buyer to its
supplier more than competence disruption does.
H3b. Integrity disruption leads to a large buyer's using more mediated
power than competence disruption does.
Suppliers’ size differential is also an indicator of levels of information sharing
and uncertainty. A large buying firm is clearly aware that the size leverage and
associated dependence and power advantage can deter a small supplier from
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taking advantage of the relationship (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). In contrast, large
firms are more likely to hide their agenda and, therefore, be less transparent in
terms of sharing information compared to small firms (Villena & Craighead, 2017).
Although in a general context, large buyer would be more committed to the
large supplier than to the small one (Morgan & Hunt, 1994), in a disruption the
buyer’s suspicion of the reason behind the disruption would not be decreased
facing with a large supplier. With larger suppliers’ greater uncertainty and greater
intention to hide information, large buyers will use the supplier-induced disruption
as an opportunity to evaluate their suppliers. In a supplier-induced disruption
situation and primarily when the supplier's unethical purpose causes the
disruption, the buyer’s concerns about the large supplier are confirmed. Therefore,
in an integrity disruption, a large buyer may suspect a large supplier, more than a
small supplier, of being the disruption’s cause, thus leading to more devastating
damage to the buyer’s relationship commitment and greater use of mediated
power with a large supplier.
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H4a. Integrity disruption is more damaging to a large buyer's commitment
to a large supplier than to a small supplier.
H4b. Integrity disruption strengthens a large buyer's willingness to exert
mediated power- coercive, legal legitimate, and reward strategies—on a large
supplier than on a small supplier.

Research Methods
Using a vignette-based experiment to collect the data for this research, we
asked participants to assume the role of a buying firm's representative and to
handle a buyer-supplier relationship issue (Eckerd, 2016; Rungtusanatham, Wallin,
& Eckerd, 2011). Vignette-based experiments engage participants with immersive
scenarios commonly found in inter-organizational relationships (Rungtusanatham
et al., 2011). In such experiments, participants are free to reveal their behaviors,
thoughts, and decisions after being presented a scenario.
A 2 (large vs. small supplier) x 2 (competence vs. integrity disruption)
between-subject scenario-based experiment was conducted to determine a large
buyer's perspective of the relationship after experiencing a supplier-induced
disruption. As with Rungtusanatham et al. (2011), we included a common module
(constant statements) and an experimental module (varied statements).
Participants were first assigned the role of the large buyer, which has a relationship
with a large or small supplier in a general buyer-supplier exchange. The scenarios
were presented sequentially, with the first scenario describing the supplier’s size
as either large or small. The second scenario involved a type of disruption, either
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competence- or integrity-based. The buying and supplying firms’ sizes were
categorized based on the number of employees; a large supplier has more than
10,000 employees while a small supplier has fewer than 50 employees. The Small
Business Administration (SBA), an autonomous U.S. government agency assisting
small businesses, suggests the criteria for defining a small firm based on employee
size, which can range from fewer than 100 to fewer than 1500 depending on the
industries (SBA, Small Business Size Regulations, 2021). Consistent with the
definition and to make the difference more salient for participants to identify the
size difference, we chose employee numbers fewer than 50 for small firms and
more than 10,000 for large firms.

The participants were presented with the

following scenario: a supplier caused a disruption by shipping a batch of defective
products to a plant, resulting in the company’s experiencing delays to its customers.
The reason for the disruption can be attributed to either integrity disruption or
competence disruption. Integrity disruption is caused by the supplier's purposefully
purchasing low-quality materials to inflate margins. In contrast, competence
disruption is caused by lack of knowledge and expertise. This experiment’s
scenarios are presented in Appendix A. A counterbalancing approach of
manipulation checks was used (Perdue & Summers, 1986). Participants in the
main test were asked the manipulation check question after being exposed to
manipulated scenarios but before being asked the question about the dependent
measures. Participants in the pilot test were asked the manipulation check
question after being asked the dependent measures questions. For the dependent
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measures, participants were asked to describe their perceived commitment and
preferred power strategy.
Pilot Test, Sample, Manipulation, and Realism Checks
A pilot test with 56 subjects recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk,
73.2 percent male, Mage=33.25) provided room for improvement in the experiment
design, and minor changes were made to enhance the clarity before collecting the
main study’s data. We then recruited 266 MTurk workers (65.5 percent male,
Mage=35.51) for the main study. MTurk has been identified as providing reliable
results (Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2013), generalizability beyond the
contextual settings (Kaufmann et al., 2018; Paolacci & Chandler, 2014), and even
more attentive compared to the traditional subject pool samples (Hauser &
Schwarz, 2016). Given the nature of the disruption event, participants
anonymously recruited from online survey platform are free from confidential
concerns and more willing to reveal their thoughts (Porter, Outlaw, Gale, & Cho,
2019). To achieve adequately qualified participants for this study we conducted
several screening methods. In the recruiting message, it is clearly stated that only
participants have working experience in the supply chain will be qualified for
participating the study and paid. In addition, a qualifier of job function with
“management” provided by MTurk was implemented to narrow down the manager
role of the participants. Furthermore, industries the participants work in and length
of working experience in the supply chain area were collected as control variable.
With the use of attention check, recruiting requirement and qualification settings
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as screening methods, proper panel of participants from MTurk can be by and
large achieved (Sharpe Wessling, Huber, & Netzer, 2017).
Manipulation checks were performed, and manipulated factors were
confirmed. For the first scenario, a question ("What is the size of the supplier?")
was used to assess the supplier's perceived size. Response to the large supplier
scenario was significantly higher (M = 6.04, SD = 1.00) than to the small supplier
scenario (M = 2.71, SD = 1.93, F (1,265) = 305.45, p < 0.001). For the second
scenario, the average of three items was used to assess competence as the
perceived cause of failure: lack of skill, a competency issue, and insufficient
knowledge. The average of three items was used to measure integrity as the cause:
intentional, dishonest, and a disruption of principles. Response on the competency
scale was significantly higher in the competence treatment (M = 5.34, SD =1.03)
than in the integrity treatment (M = 4.58, SD = 1.54, F(1,265) = 21.82, p < 0.001).
Response on the integrity scale was significantly higher for the integrity treatment
(M = 5.49, SD =1.21) than for the competence treatment (M = 4.48, SD = 1.63,
F(1,265) = 33.88, p < 0.001). All items used in the manipulation checks were
assessed on a seven-point Likert scale.
A realism check assesses the extent to which participants find the scenarios
provided to be realistic and believable and whether participants can relate the
scenarios to real life (Rungtusanatham et al., 2011). More specifically, participants
were asked to assess their agreement or disagreement with the three statements:
“I found the situation described in the scenario to be realistic”, “I believe the
situation described in the scenario could happen in real life”, and “I took my
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assumed role seriously while conducting the survey”. The average of three items
was used to assess the perceived level of realism on a seven-point Likert scale.
Based on the realism check question, our participants agreed that the study's
design was realistic (M = 5.84, SD = 0.85).
Measurement and Model Assessment
In addition to the manipulation and realism checks, several multi- and
single-item variables were included in this study. To determine size asymmetry’s
and disruption type’s impact on buyer-supplier relationships, we measured buyers’
commitment to the supplier causing the disruption and the buyers’ preferred
resolution strategies. The multi-item variable was used to measure commitment
and was adopted from previously validated scales from Gray and Handley (2011).
The single-item variable for measuring mediated power was adapted from the
multi-item scales from Handley and Benton (2012). The items for the multi-item
scales are presented in Appendix B, and single-item variables are summarized
below.
As each of the power bases was measured by a single-item question,
common method bias could exist and threaten the analysis (Podsakoff, MacKenzie,
Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). To minimize the likelihood of such bias, we ensured all
the participants' confidentiality, randomized the order of specific questions, located
measurement of independent and dependent variables separately within the
survey, and clarified the scales via a pilot test (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Moreover,
we conducted a supplementary CFA incorporating an additional, unmeasured
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methods factor and the hypothesized factors (Podsakoff et al., 2003) to estimate
the possibility of common method bias. As a result, each item continued to load
significantly on its intended construct (p < .001). While we cannot conclude that
our analysis is entirely free from common method bias, these designs and
assessments leave us with less concern about such bias in this research.
Control variables were included in the model to account for their potentially
confounding influence on the analysis. Length of working experience was
measured by a single-item question asking the amount of time (in years) the
participants had worked in the supply chain area. Demographic information such
as age, gender, education level were collected. Descriptive statistics and
correlations among all study variables are presented in Table 2.
To evaluate the multi-item scales used in the model (commitment), a
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted in Mplus 8.5. Overall,
measurement model fit is acceptable based on several model fit indices
(RMSEA=0.10 with 90% CI:0.051, 0.159; χ2/df=7.30; CFI=0.99; TLI=0.98;
SRMR=0.01) after eliminating 36 attention check failures (N=230). Convergent
validity was reflected by the significant loadings of all the construct commitment’s
items (see Appendix B). Reliability for our multi-item construct commitment was
strongly confirmed by Cronbach’s alpha value (0.94>0.70), composite radiality
(0.96>0.60), and average variance extracted (AVE: 0.85>0.50) (Bagozzi & Yi,
1988; Carmines & Zeller, 1979; Fornell & Larcker, 1981).
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Analysis and Results
Linear regression analysis and PROCESS Model 4 and Model 1 with 5,000
bootstrap samples were used to test our hypotheses (Hayes & Little, 2018).
PROCESS macros from Hayes (2018) are often used to estimate simple and
advanced statistical models, such as moderating and mediating models used in
research. Supplier size (binary variable: 1=large buyer with large supplier/0=large
buyer with a small supplier) was used as the independent variable. Commitment,
mediated power (average of all bases), and individual power bases were used as
dependent variables. Table 3 summarizes the regression results.
Results in Table 3 suggest that supplier size positively affects a large
buyer's preference for mediated power, particularly reward, in a supplier-induced
disruption, which is the opposite result of what is predicted in Hypothesis 1. We
predict in H1 that the large buyer would prefer more to use mediated power with
small suppliers than with large suppliers whereas we find that large buyer would
prefer more to use mediated power with large suppliers than small suppliers. Thus,
Hypothesis 1 is not supported.
In H2, we predict that the commitment mediates the relations between
supplier size and buyer’s preference for mediated power, measured jointly and
individually. To test H2, we ran the supplier size’s indirect effects on the preference
for mediated power through commitment using PROCESS Model 4. Results
suggest that supplier size (large vs. small) significantly impacts a large buyer's
preferred use of mediated power with an effect size of 0.18 with 95% CI [.07,.31]
through this buyer's commitment to its supplier. Specifically, the supplier size’s
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indirect effects on both reward and monitor are significant with an effect size of
0.46 and 0.10 with 95% CI [.18,.74] and [.01,.23], respectively. However, the
supplier size’s indirect effect on the use of coercive power is not significant (-.019,
95% CI [-.10,.08]). Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is partially supported.
Linear regression results of disruption type’s effect on commitment and
mediated power bases are summarized in Table 4. In H3a, we predict that integrity
disruption damages more to the larger buyer’s commitment than competence
disruption does. The finding confirms that integrity disruption damages the
commitment significantly more than competence disruption does at a p-value level
of 0.05. In H3b, we predict that integrity disruption strengthens the large buyer’s
preference of mediated power than competence disruption does, but the
regression analysis is not significant. Hypothesis 3a is supported, but 3b is not.
In H4a and H4b, we test the interaction between supplier size and disruption
type and predict that Integrity disruption damage more to a large buyer's
commitment to a large supplier than to a small supplier (H4a), and integrity
disruption strengthens a large buyer's willingness to exert mediated powercoercive, legal legitimate, and reward strategies—on a large supplier than on a
small supplier (H4b). To test H4a and H4b, we ran PROCESS Model 1.
Summarized in Table 5, regression results suggest that the interaction does not
significantly affect commitment or preferred mediated power. H4a and H4b are not
supported. However, supplier size’s conditional effects on preferred use of
mediated power with effect size of .34 and 95% CI [.02,.66], particularly reward
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with effect size of 1.12 and 95% CI [.49,1.75], are significant in an integrity
disruption but not in a competence disruption.

Discussion
Implications
While size asymmetry has been discussed in managing buyer-supplier
relationships, discussions tend to be limited to one pair (large buyer and small
supplier or small buyer and large supplier) of the relationship and under a normal
(i.e., no disruption) circumstance (Lee & Johnson, 2012). Large buying firms often
have

a

complex

supply

chain

network

including

diversified

supplying

organizations. We enhanced the discussion of supplier size’s effect by including
both large and small suppliers. Furthermore, we identified the boundary conditions
(i.e., supplier-induced disruption type) by which supplier size’s effect would or
would not hold. Grounded in commitment-trust theory, our scenario-based
experiments tested commitment’s key mediating role

in buyer-supplier

relationships in supplier-induced disruptions.
Our findings provide several interesting insights. First, while Handley and
Benton (2012) suggested that the buyers would exert less mediated power on
large suppliers (thus posing greater switching difficulties), we show that large
buyers prefer to rely on more of the mediated power when dealing with large
suppliers compared to small ones in a supplier-induced disruption. In a nondisrupted day, buyers would be more concerned with the large suppliers’
commitment due to higher dependence, thus reducing the use of mediated power,
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which often negatively affects commitment (Benton & Maloni, 2005; Hunt and
Nevin, 1974). In fact, we confirmed that buyers remain more committed to large
suppliers (compared to small suppliers) even when those suppliers cause
disruptions; such commitment can be the result of dependence and switching
difficulties (Handley & Benton, 2012). However, when a supplier-induced
disruption occurs, buyers may attribute cause to the suppliers’ opportunistic
behaviors. Compared to small suppliers, large suppliers tend to share less
information and are perceived as being more opportunistic (Villena & Craighead,
2017). Large buyers may be well aware of that tendency and suspect that large
suppliers’ opportunistic behaviors are behind the disruption; thus, those buyers
prefer to exert mediated power on large suppliers. Furthermore, large buyers are
also more dependent on large suppliers; therefore, a reward strategy may be
adopted to influence and control the large suppliers but not to be punitive. We
believe this result reveals boundary conditions in exerting mediated power and
also indicates the need for further examining the psychological rationale behind
those boundaries.
Second, while firm size has been suggested to be associated with many
buyer-supplier relationship characteristics, such as trust, power, dependence,
commitment, or knowledge in smooth operations (Gundlach, Achrol, & Mentzer,
1995; Johnson & Ford, 2008; Lee & Johnson, 2012; Morgan & Hunt, 1994), the
literature is largely silent about firm size’s impact when buyer-supplier exchanges
are disrupted. One exception in the literature is Cheng et al. (2019, demonstrating
that in a supplier-induced event, the effectiveness of supplier’s recovery actions is
33

related to the buyer’s perception of supplier dependence. Based on commitmenttrust theory, we used supplier size as the antecedent and mediated power as the
outcome to examine commitment’s mediating role in a disruption context. Our
finding confirms that the positive connection between a supplier firm’s size and a
buyer’s commitment to the relationship still holds in a disrupted situation (Holmlund
& Kock, 1996). Furthermore, we found that the positive connection between a
supplier firm’s size and the use of mediated power is effective, mediated by buyer
commitment. Complementing the discussion about the resolutions’ effectiveness,
we show that the preference of the buyer (i.e., the victim) in resolving the disruption
is dependent on supplier size, mediated by buyer commitment.
Third, while the disruption type has been studied as a critical factor that
deteriorates to varying degrees the buyer-supplier relationship (Dirks et al. 2009),
we took an additional step in investigating the disruption type’s interaction with
supplier size. Our results show that integrity disruption has stronger negative
effects on commitment than competence disruption does, thus providing empirical
evidence of the effects of disruption types (Dirks et al., 2011). Although the
interaction between disruption type and supplier size is not significant in testing the
effect of supplier size, the conditional effect of supplier on mediated power only
holds in an integrity disruption. On the one hand, this finding confirms that large
buyers perceive integrity disruption as a more severe event (compared to
competence disruption) and attribute the cause to dishonesty and low integrity,
thus significantly reducing commitment. Moreover, the connection between
supplier size and mediated power only holds true in an integrity disruption, thus
34

strengthening that disruption’s salient role. On the other hand, the buyer would not
have a different preference regarding the use of mediated power under a different
type of disruption. The disconnect between the disruption type’s impact on the
buyer’s commitment and preferred use of mediated power needs to be further
researched.
Finally, our research provides managerial insights for both suppliers and
buyers. Given the diversity of a large buyer’s supply base and the frequency of
supplier-induced disruptions, both buyers and suppliers should work to be aware
of and manage their relationships. Large suppliers should recognize that although
buyer’s commitment to them may remain relatively higher than to small suppliers
in a supplier-induced disruption, buyers may prefer to use mediated power
strategies, particularly rewards, with them. Although they may not be true
“rewards,” their selection could indicate that the buyer intends to exert influence
and control over large suppliers and that an integrity disruption’s effect is more
salient. Small suppliers should be aware of their disadvantages in terms of lower
buyer commitment compared to large suppliers’ when both small and large
suppliers cause disruptions. Given the knowledge of the perceptions of buyers and
the resolution they may initiate, both large and small suppliers should be able to
more effectively communicate with buyers in coping with a supplier-induced
disruption. In addition, our research offers large buyers insights for designing their
supply base and resilience plans based on their supply chain’s risk levels.
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Limitations and Future Research
Our findings’ limitations should also be considered. First, although our
experiment design may be internally valid with controls and manipulated scenarios,
the scenarios’ general description cannot fully capture all the characteristics in real
cases, which would lose external validity and generalizability in specific industries.
Observational or archival data regarding buyers’ real actions after supplier-induced
disruptions can be used to complement our study. Second, using a single
individual to represent the buying firm’s decision-making manager is one limitation.
This approach has been largely adopted in SCM research to evaluate
interpersonal trust, interorganizational trust, and psychological contract overfulfilment (Bachrach & Bendoly, 2011; Esslinger et al., 2019; Kaufmann et al.,
2018). We acknowledge our design’s shortcomings and encourage future
researchers to replicate real decision-making processes by incorporating teamoriented discussions. Third, providing participants two descriptive scenarios may
not have eliminated or captured the responses’ potential bias. Future researchers
could use visualization techniques (e.g., video of simulated scenarios) in their
experiment design to help participants place themselves in the designed scenario.
Fourth, while we presented the scenarios sequentially, we were unable to capture
all the changes in perception before, during, and after the disruption. Future
studies could use longitudinal designs with multistage experiments to better infer
causality. Fifth, we used binary variables to measure supplier size and disruption
type which may result in potential oversimplification. Future research can use
continuous variables for measuring supplier size and disruption type to ensure the
36

depth of the information captured by the participants. Finally, we provided a onesided opinion (i.e., of a large buyer) and disregarded the opinions of three potential
parties (large supplier, small buyer, and small supplier) in a dyad relationship. The
voices from all sides are worth are worth hearing to achieve a comprehensive
understanding of all parties’ reactions.
We believe several other research paths could be developed based on this
current research. Future studies could extend commitment-trust theory in a
disruption setting by incorporating other psychological constructs to enrich the
understanding of decision-making processes and psychological reasons leading
to the outcomes. This approach could contribute to not only the theory but also the
supply chain field. Incorporating other related psychological constructs could better
bridge the antecedents by capturing more psychological changes, thus better
explaining the reason behind various outcomes and performances in various
contexts. Specifically, dynamic contexts are common in the supply chain world;
thus, a deeper understanding of the potential reactions in a supplier-induced
disruption would be insightful for both researchers and practitioners. Furthermore,
while our study has captured certain psychological reasons and behaviors in a
disruption context, much more research is needed before we can fully understand
the rationale involved. Therefore, we encourage researchers to consider
qualitative studies that would capture rich data in interpreting real supply chain
managers’ perceptions and decision-making processes, thus providing a deeper
and wider understanding of the inter-organizational relationships in a supplierinduced disruption.
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CHAPTER II - ESSAY 2 – SIZE ASYMMETRY IN BUYER-SUPPLIER
RELATIONSHIPS: LITERATURE OVERVIEW, CHALLENGES, AND
OPPORTUNITIES
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Abstract
While firm size has often been included as a default control variable for
inter-organizational relationship studies, little is known about the role of a firm’s
size, particularly size asymmetry, in affecting buyer-supplier relationships. This
essay evaluates current literature on firm size’s role in buyer-supplier relationships.
We first discuss size asymmetry’s effect as discussed in supply chain literature.
Second, we offer an overview of literature on size asymmetry in buyer-supplier
relationships. Third, we provide suggestions for future research on size
asymmetry, particularly involving supply chain disruptions. Last, we discuss
challenges associated with measuring the firm size and collecting data in size
asymmetry settings and provide recommendations to address related issues.

Introduction
Size asymmetry is a critical indicator in analyzing buyer-supplier
relationships (BSRs). For an individual firm, firm size directly implies a firm’s
access to internal and external resources, constraints, capacities, and growth
strategy resulting from managerial decisions; it indirectly moderates the firm’s
inventory leanness, operational efficiency, and sustainability development (Cao &
Zhang, 2011; Chuang, Oliva, & Heim, 2019). For different size firms in a buyersupplier exchange, size asymmetry simplifies the complexity of the interorganizational relationship. In the research on BSRs, size asymmetry has been
associated with other relationship characteristics, such as mutuality, conflict,
interpersonal inconsistency, intensity, power, and dependence (Lee & Johnson,
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2012; Ford & Saren, 2001; Gulati & Sytch, 2007; Gundlach, Achrol, & Mentzer,
1995). Moreover, Villena and Craighead (2017) examine how size asymmetry
impacts opportunism and performance in BSRs. With only a few exceptions, the
size asymmetry’s degree and directions are included and studied for buyers and
suppliers (Villena & Craighead, 2017; Wang & Gerchak, 2003). Prior studies
(Avittathur & Swamidass, 2007; Johnson & Ford, 2008; Lee & Johnson, 2012)
primarily focus on one type of the size asymmetric relationship (e.g., larger buyers
and smaller suppliers). In a size asymmetrical study, researchers often merely use
size asymmetry as a context setting due to the convenience of available data
(Devalkar & Krishnan, 2019; Lee & Klassen, 2008). Therefore, size asymmetry,
one of the most simple but indicative factors, largely exists in BSRs yet is also
surprisingly overlooked.
It is important to understand (a) the concept of asymmetry because
asymmetric relationships are considered highly risky with inherent instability
(Kumar, Scheer, & Steenkamp, 1995; Thomas & Esper, 2010) and (b) the different
ways that asymmetries are captured and examined in the literature. Power
imbalance (a) exists when firm A is more dependent on firm B than B on A and (b)
influences sustainability development, supply chain collaboration, adaptation, and
other buyer-supplier relationship performance and qualities (Casciaro & Piskorski,
2005; Nyaga, Lynch, Marshal, & Ambrose, 2013; Touboulic, Chicksand & Walker,
2012). While Brinkhoff, Ozer, and Sargut (2014) have suggested that asymmetric
dependence negatively affects trust and has no effect on supply chain project
success, Gulati and Sytch (2007) recommend considering the overall value
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generated through power and dependence asymmetry. Asymmetric trust, the
dyadic level of each party’s trust depending on the degree and direction, is
suggested to disrupt the joint performance of the inter-organizational relationship
(Tomlinson, Dineen, & Lewicki, 2009). Information asymmetry between two parties
can significantly impact one party’s choice of contracts, such as quantity discount
and wholesale price contracts, managing supplier quality, and delivery efficiency
(Biwas, Avittathur, & Chatterjee, 2016; Cachon & Zhang, 2006; Corbett, Zhou, &
Tang, 2004; Corbett & De Groote, 2000; Nikoofal & Gumus, 2018). Demand
asymmetry, defined as a buyer’s biases in assessing the offering from different
suppliers (i.e., incumbent challenger suppliers) and caused by the buyer’s
switching inertia, significantly affects the buyer’s supplier selection decisions (Li,
Madhok, Plaschka, & Verma, 2006). Yet, one of the most simple and salient
asymmetries – size – in BSRs is oftentimes overlooked. Therefore, this essay’s
two primary objectives are (a) to synthesize the extant body of literature on size
asymmetry in BRSs and highlight the importance of scholarly inquiry and (b) to
systematically identify key empirical, methodological, and theoretical opportunities
and challenges in order to enhance our understanding size asymmetry’s role in
BSRs.

Overview of the Literature
Rather than providing an extensive literature review, this essay highlights
the salient distinctions of firm size’s measurements and size asymmetry’s role in
BSRs studies. First, we focus on the measurement methods researchers refer to
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when they discuss size asymmetry (i.e., large vs. small firms). Moreover, we
identify the following roles of size asymmetry discussed in BSRs literature: contextsetting element, moderating variable, control variable, and main indicator. In Table
6, we provide an overview of seminal papers (from the leading journals in supply
chain management suggested by SCM Journal List) discussing size asymmetry in
BRSs.
Measurement of firm size.
The measurement of firm size speaks to the criteria used to distinguish
large, medium, and small buyer and supplier firms. More than half the studies
about size asymmetry use the number of employees when assessing size; but the
threshold adopted in the research varies across industries, regions, and
methodologies. For example, Soundararajan and Brammer (2018) selected small
sub-suppliers operating in the South Indian garment industry with fewer than 100
workers. Nassimbeni (2003) follows the Italian regulation on the eyewear district
and defines small suppliers as those with fewer than 22 employees. When the
number of suppliers is enormous in a certain setting (e.g., overall manufacturing
sector), researchers tend to bundle the small and medium firms together for
analysis. For example, firms with fewer than 500 employees are considered smalland medium-size enterprises in Canada (Larson, Carr, & Dhariwal, 2005), whereas
300 are considered the cut-off point for small- and medium-size enterprises in
South Korea (Kim, Hur, & Schoenherr, 2015). To improve the quality of key
informants likely possessing substantial knowledge of the focal firm’s BSRs,
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Schoenherr, Griffith and Chandra (2014) categorized the firms with fewer than 50
employees as small- and medium-size enterprises. Moreover, while a firm’s size
is often measured as a continuous variable in modelling studies (Wang & Gerchak,
2003), a more salient threshold was adopted in the vignette-based experimental
work with a small firm of 70 employees and a large firm of 15,200 employees in
the chemical industry to distinguish firm size (Hartmann & Moeller, 2014). By
assessing firm size’s rudimentary characteristic (i.e., the number of employees),
the aforementioned papers offer valuable insights into potential room for unifying
the firm-size category based on the number of employees for research and
regulation purposes.
While the number of employees is the most frequently used measurement
of firm size in BSRs literature, sales and revenue, order quantity, capacity and cost
structure, and various combinations are often adopted to distinguish between large
and small firms. Using firm sales, often represented by the calculated sales’
logarithmic value given the objective measure’s right-skewness, is the secondmost frequent approach (Wagner, 2003; Villena & Craighead, 2017). A
combination of number of employees and annual sales is suggested as a safer
approach (Lee & Klassen, 2008). Interestingly, Avittathur and Swamidass (2007)
categorize large and small suppliers based on the buyer’s annual purchase, with
a cut-off point at $2 million. Different from the general employee number and/or
sales approaches, studies employing mathematical modelling methodologies tend
to distinguish between large and small firms by assessing a firm’s capacity,
production costs, operating costs, and other cost structures (Ozer and Raz, 2011;
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Wang and Gerchak, 2003). The choice of criteria for firm size serves well for the
choice of industry, region, and methodology for the research. Clearly, there is room
for researchers to examine the validity of the use of criteria by replicating the extant
research or comparing the influence of firm size’s effect using various
measurement methods.
Role of size asymmetry.
The firm size’s role determines how size asymmetry is positioned and
researched in BSRs studies. As noted in Table 6, size asymmetry in general
serves as one of the following roles: context-setting element, moderating variable,
control variable, or main indicator. When size asymmetry only serves as one of the
context-setting elements, the firm size of buyers and suppliers is pre-determined
and generally not analyzed. Having a size asymmetrical context setting is usually
because (a) the data’s availability (e.g., from Office Depot, a large supplier)
required the authors to research small-size customers in Boyer and Olson (2003);
(b) the industry’s main structure (e.g., small and medium suppliers) represents
most of the large buyers’ customers (Kim et al., 2015); (a) suitable to the topic’s
focus, e.g., the important role of small- and medium-size enterprises in
environmental performance is missing (Lee & Klassen, 2008). While authors
usually justify the selection of the size asymmetric setting, they more often
recognize the limitation of losing sight of BSRs’ omitted size combinations (Kim et
al., 2015). Furthermore, some papers control for firm size. In some situations,
controlling for firm size does not yield statistical significance (Schoenherr et al.,
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2014); however, more often it does (Cao & Zhang, 2011; Kim et al., 2015; Leung,
Li, & Sun, 2020). This significance demonstrates that accounting for firm size is
important and that more work should focus on it. Across the literature’s
hypotheses, firm size is tested for both main and moderating effects. For the main
effect, supplier size is associated with differences in relationship exchanges
(Larson et al., 2005). A firm’s financial performance after its implementation of total
quality management (TQM) (Hendricks & Singhal, 2001) and decentralized
channel performance (Wang & Gerchak, 2003) are related to firm size. For the
moderating effect, firm size conditions a firm’s inventory leanness and operational
efficiency (Chuang et al. 2019), supply chain collaboration, collaborative
advantage, and firm performance (Cao & Zhang, 2011). These streams provide
examples of the role firm size can play in an asymmetric BSR and, more
importantly, emphasize that BSRs scholars should endeavor to expand
understanding of size asymmetry’s role. Moreover, almost all the conversations
involving size asymmetry in BSRs are under a normal operation setting (i.e., no
disruptions). It is even more critical to understand firm size’s role in an asymmetric
relationship when the supply chain is disrupted, the complexity is exponentially
boosted, and the consequences can be devastating.

Suggestions for Future Research
Research opportunities emerge from our literature overview. In this section,
we provide an agenda for future research paths by discussing three sets of
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challenges and opportunities. Furthermore, we propose a series of research
questions noteworthy for researchers to consider in addressing each topic.
Unifying the measurement of firm size.
It is surprising to observe the variety of criteria BSRs scholars use to
distinguish between large and small firms in the literature. The number of
employees as firm size’s measurement is widely used by government
administrations, such as the U.S. Small Business Administration. Even for studies
using the number of employees, the cut-off point varies across studies and, mostly,
regions. For example, one firm with 22 workers in Italy and one with 500 in Canada
can both be considered referred “small firms” (Nassimbeni, 2003; Larson et al.,
2005). Understandably, small and large firms can be relative concepts in different
regions and industries. However, it is confusing to call a firm with 500 employees
“small” when the company must have established a systematic management
system compared with one that has 10 employees and the owner makes almost
all the decisions.
The total assets, total sales, or median sales are the common measures
widely used in corporate finance and adopted in many size asymmetry studies in
BSRs (e.g., Villena & Craighead, 2017). Similar to using the number of employees,
different thresholds of these financial values are employed in distinguishing
between large and small firms. It is unrealistic to require all the researchers to
follow one rule to identify size asymmetry, but the divergence of firm size’s
measurement and the importance of developing a unified handbook must be
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recognized and addressed. Otherwise, we will create more issues when we
discuss size asymmetry and mean different things. To assess and address this
issue, we suggest that researchers examine the following question: Do the effects
hold when the extant literature is tested by using a different measurement of firm
size?
Firm size is indicative of a firm’s structure and hierarchical system. While a
small firm with a few employees only listens to one voice for most of its decisions,
a large firm often has a purchasing or supplying team along with three managers
to approve a single change. Efficiency of decision-making process can be largely
related to the complexity level of the firm structures. Team-based supplier or buyer
decision-making scenarios can often be found in practice; however, research has
mostly focused on the organizational or personal level while tackling team-based
interactions. As such, a study of inter-organizational buyer-supplier teams in a size
asymmetrical relationship would offer tremendous insight.
Incorporating supply chain disruptions.
To date, the BSRs literature involving size asymmetry is limited in the
operational context without disruption. Size asymmetry’s role as a context element,
moderator, control variable, and main indicator in BSRs has been largely studied
in a non-disrupted condition; but little is known when the exchange is disrupted.
Given the firm size’s critical role in BSRs, especially when asymmetry exists, it is
unclear how different-size buyers in a disruption scenario perceive the relationship
and whether they react differently when facing different-size suppliers. Firm size
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asymmetry implies the existence of power, dependence, and asymmetry in
switching costs and difficulties, which all matter in coping with supply chain
disruptions. Therefore, it is critical for researchers and practitioners to understand
how the firms perceive, react, and resolve the supply chain disruption when size
asymmetry is involved. Thus, we propose two questions to examine size
asymmetry’s effect in supply chain disruptions: (a) How do different-sized buyers
(suppliers) perceive, react to, and resolve working with different-size suppliers
(buyers) in supply chain disruptions (supplier-induced disruption/buyer-induced
disruption)? (b) What are the contingencies and their influence on firm size’s effect
in supply chain disruptions?
Furthermore, a buyer-supplier relationship often involves more than just two
parties: the buyer and the supplier. Specifically, supply chain disruptions are often
caused by other forces, such as third-party logistics services, banks,
intermediaries, and government. For example, a small supplier often has a small
order and has to use a Less-Than-Truckload method to complete it. When a
shortage of labor capacity occurs, the distribution center often prioritizes the FullTruckload orders from large suppliers. In that situation, the delivery’s delay is in
fact caused by the distribution center, not the small supplier. It is important to
understand how the buyer and the supplier in this scenario perceive and resolve
this type of disruption. In a similar fashion, it is relevant how the buyer-supplier
relationship is affected in a disruption when banks or government regulations are
involved. Moreover, an intermediary plays a critical role of coordinating and
harmonizing the buyer-supplier relationship by serving both a buyer and a supplier.
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In a disrupted situation, intermediaries often proactively resolve the issue and
sometimes absorb the loss to guard and secure the exchange. However, little is
known about the intermediary’s importance in a size asymmetric buyer-supplier
relationship, especially when the supply chain is disrupted. We suggest that
scholars investigate the roles of the aforementioned third parties involved in BSRs,
both in a normal and a disrupted operation.
Seizing the empirical opportunities.
Extant literature involving size asymmetry tends to use case study and
survey data with very few archival and modelling approaches. Mainly focusing on
the case study and the survey limits the researchers’ options due to the data
access, one of the reasons the firm size’s various criteria are used. Moreover, most
of the studies, except a few modelling papers, focus only on one-sided size
asymmetry, i.e., large buyers and small suppliers or large suppliers and small
buyers. Villena and Craighead’s (2017) study is the only one to date that has
empirically examined all types of size asymmetry.
Despite the increasing number of empirical studies involving size
asymmetry, researchers face empirical challenges. Experiments are suitable for
tackling these empirical challenges. However, the experimental approach has
been largely overlooked in the size asymmetrical BSRs field except for Hartmann
and Moeller’s (2014) paper. Experimental work enables authors to examine the
validity of different measures of firm size and is particularly suitable for behavioral
research in supply chain. Experiments allow researchers to overcome the
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challenges of data collection, thus achieving academic goals with a complete data
set containing all types of asymmetries to investigate the research topic holistically.

Conclusions
Although one of the basics of a firm’s characteristics, firm size has been
surprisingly overlooked in BSRs but is often assessed by scholars using various
criteria. Moreover, size asymmetry’s importance has been recognized as affecting
the decisions and qualities of inter-organizational relationships, but it can be
problematic and even misleading when people use the same term but refer to
different measurements. Although size asymmetry’s rudimentary role has been
examined in terms of power and dependence, BSRs have evolved into an
increasingly dynamic and complex stage. There is no longer a simple dyadic
relationship between one buyer and one supplier; instead, the relationship involves
more parties and often disrupted conditions. COVID as a major disruption is a
reminder that the supply chain will always be disrupted and that researchers have
plenty of opportunities to advance understandings of size asymmetry and how it
affects BSRs in both a normal operation day and a disrupted situation. Therefore,
we encourage scholars across disciplines to join in this discussion and contribute
to build this body of knowledge.

50

REFERENCES
Adams, J.H., Khoja, F.M., & Kauffman, R. (2012). An Empirical Study of Buyer
Supplier Relationships within Small Business Organizations. Journal of
Small Business Management, 50(1), 20-40.
Anderson, E., & Weitz, B. (1992). The Use of Pledges to Build and Sustain
Commitment in Distribution Channels. Journal of Marketing Research,
29(1), 18–34.
Arend, R. (2006). SME-Supplier Alliance Activity in Manufacturing Contingent
Benefits and Perceptions. Strategic Management Journal, 27, 741–763.
Avittathur, B., & Swamidass, P. (2007). Matching Plant Flexibility and Supplier
Flexibility: Lessons from Small Suppliers of U.S. Manufacturing Plants in
India. Journal of Operations Management, 25(3), 717-735.
Bagozzi, R.P. & Youjae Yi, Y. (1988). On the Evaluation of Structural Equation
Models. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 16(1), 74–94.
Bachrach, D.G. & Bendoly, E. (2011). Rigor in Behavioral Experiments: A Basic
Primer for Supply Chain Management Researchers. Journal of Supply
Chain Management, 47(3), 5–8.
Beekman, A.V., & Robinson, R.B. (2004). Supplier Partnerships and the Small,
High Growth Firm: Selecting for Success. Journal of Small Business
Management, 42(1), 59–77.
Benton, W.C., & Maloni, M.J. (2005). The Influence of Power Driven Buyer/Seller
Relationships on Supply Chain Satisfaction. Journal of Operations
Management, 23, 1–22.
Biwas, I., Avittathur, B., & Chatterjee, A.K. (2016). Impact of Structure, Market
Share and Information Asymmetry on Supply Contracts for A Single
Supplier Multiple Buyer Network. European Journal of Operational
Research, 253(3), 593-601.
Boyer, K.K., & Olson, J.R. (2002). Drivers of Internet Purchasing Success.
Production and Operations Management, 11(4), 480-498.
Brinkhoff, A., Ozer, O., & Sargu, G. (2014). All You Need Is Trust? An Examination
of Inter-organizational Supply Chain Projects. Production and Operations
Management, 24(2), 181-200.
Brown, J.R., Lusch, R.E., & Nicholson, C.Y. (1995). Power and Relationship
51

Commitment: Their Impact on Marketing Channel Member Performance.
Journal of Retailing, 71(4), 363–392.
Burnham, T.A., Frels, J.K., & Mahajan, V. (2003). Consumer Switching Costs: A
Typology, Antecedents, and Consequences. Journal of the Academy of
Marketing Science, 31(2), 109–126.
Butler, J.K., Jr., & Cantrell, R.S. (1984). A Behavioral Decision Theory Approach
to Modeling Dyadic Trust in Superiors and Subordinates. Psychological
Reports, 55, 19–28.
Carmines, E.G. & Richard A. Zeller, R.A. (1979). Reliability and Validity
Assessment. Newbury Park, [Calif.] ;: SAGE.
Casciaro, T., & Piskorski, M.J. (2005). Power Imbalance, Mutual Dependence, and
Constraint Absorption: A Closer Look at Resource Dependence Theory.”
Administrative Science Quarterly, 50(2), 167–199.
Cao, M., & Zhang, Q. (2011). Supply Chain Collaboration: Impact on Collaborative
Advantage and Firm Performance. Journal of Operations Management,
29(3), 163–180.
Cheng, L., Craighead, C.W., Wang, Q., & Li, J.J. (2019). When Is the Supplier’s
Message ‘Loud and Clear’? Mixed Signals from Supplier-Induced
Disruptions and the Response.” Decision Sciences 51(2), 216–254.

Chuang, H. H., Oliva, R., & Heim, G.R. (2019). Examining the Link between
Retailer Inventory Leanness and Operational Efficiency: Moderating Roles
of Firm Size and Demand Uncertainty. Production and Operations
Management, 28(9), 2338-2364.
Cook, K.S., & Emerson, R.M. (1978). Power, Equity and Commitment in Exchange
Networks. American Sociological Review, 43(5), 721–739.
Corbett, C., D. Zhou, C. Tang. (2004). Designing Supply Contract: Contract Type
and Asymmetric Information. Management Science, 50(4): 550–559.
Craighead, C.W., Blackhurst, J., Rungtusanatham, M.J., & Handfield, R.B. (2007).
The Severity of Supply Chain Disruptions: Design Characteristics and
Mitigation Capabilities. Decision Sciences, 38(1), 131–156.
Devalkar, S.K., & Krishnan, H. (2019). The Impact of Working Capital Financing
Costs on the Efficiency of Trade Credit. Production and Operations
Management, 28(4), 878-889.
52

Dirks, K.T., Lewicki, R.J., & Zaheer, A. (2009). Repairing Relationships within and
between Organizations: Building a Conceptual Foundation. Academy of
Management Review, 34(1), 68–84.
Dirks, K.T., Kim, P.H., Ferrin, D.L., & Cooper. C.D. (2011). Understanding the
Effects of Substantive Responses on Trust Following a Transgression.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 114(2), 87–103.
Doney, P.M, & Cannon, J.P. (1997). An Examination of the Nature of Trust in
Buyer-Seller Relationships. Journal of Marketing, 61(2), 35–51.
Eckerd, S. (2016). Experiments in Purchasing and Supply Management Research.
Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 22, 258–261.
Eckerd, S., Boyer, K. K., Qi, Y., Eckerd, A., & Hill, J. A. (2016). Supply Chain
Psychological Contract Breach: An Experimental Study across National
Cultures. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 52, 68–82.
Esslinger, J., Eckerd, S., Kaufmann, L., & Carter, C. (2019). Who Cares? Supplier
Reactions to Buyer Claims after Psychological Contract Over‐Fulfillments.
Journal of Supply Chain Management, 55(4), 98–128.
Farrell, J., & Shapiro, C. (1988). Dynamic Competition with Switching Costs. Rand
Journal of Economics, 19(1), 123–137.
Ford, D., & Saren, M. (2001). Managing and Marketing Technology. London:
Thomson Learning.
Fornell, C., & Larcker, D.F. (1981). Evaluating Structural Equation Models with
Unobservable Variables and Measurement Error. Journal of Marketing
Research, 18 (1), 39–50.
Frazier, G.L., & Summers, J.O. (1984). Interfirm Influence Strategies and their
Applications within Distribution Channels. Journal of Marketing. 48(3), 43–
55.
French, J.R., & Raven, B. (1959). The Bases of Social Power. In: Dorwin, C. (Ed.),
Studies in Social Power. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.
Goodman, J.K., Cryder, C.E., & Cheema, A. (2013). Data Collection in a Flat
World: The Strengths and Weaknesses of Mechanical Turk Samples: Data
Collection in a Flat World. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 26(3),
213–224.
53

Gray, J. & Handley, S. (2011). Managing Quality in Outsourced Production:
Construct Development and Measurement Validation. Quality Management
Journal, 18(2), 26–45.
Gulati, R., & Sytch, M. (2007). Dependence Asymmetry and Joint Dependence in
Interorganizational Relationships: Effects of Embeddedness on a
Manufacturer’s Performance in Procurement Relationships. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 52(1): 32–69.
Gundlach, G.T., Achrol, R., & Mentzer, J. (1995). The Structure of Commitment in
Exchange. Journal of Marketing, 59(January), 78–92.
Handley, S.M., & Benton, W.C. (2012). The Influence of Exchange Hazards and
Power on Opportunism in Outsourcing Relationships. Journal of Operations
Management, 30, 55–68.
Hartmann, J., & Moeller, S. (2014). Chain Liability in Multitier Supply Chains?
Responsibility attributions for Unsustainable Supplier Behavior. Journal of
Operations Management, 32, 281-294.
Hauser, D. & Schwarz, N. (2016). Attentive Turkers: MTurk Participants Perform
Better on Online Attention Checks Than Do Subject Pool Participants.
Behavior Research Methods, 48(1), 400–407.
Hayes, A.F. & Little, T.D. (2018). Introduction to Mediation, Moderation, and
Conditional Process Analysis: A Regression-Based Approach. Second
edition. New York: The Guilford Press.
Hendricks, K.B., & Singhal, V.R. (2001). Firm Characteristics, Total Quality
Management, and Financial Performance. Journal of Operations
Management, 19, 269-285.
Hendricks, K.B., & Singhal, V.R. (2003). The Effect of Supply Chain Glitches on
Shareholder Wealth. Journal of Operations Management, 21(5), 501–522.
Hendricks, K.B., & Singhal, V.R. (2005a). Association Between Supply Chain
Glitches and Operating Performance. Management Science, 51(5), 695–
711.
Hendricks, K.B., & Singhal, V.R. (2005b). An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of
Supply Chain Disruptions on Long-Run Stock Price Performance and
Equity Risk of the Firm. Production and Operations Management, 14(1),
35–52.
Hendricks, K.B., Singhal, V.R., & Zhang, R. (2009). The Effect of Operational
54

Slack, Diversification, and Vertical Relatedness on the Stock Market
Reaction to Supply Chain Disruptions. Journal of Operations Management,
27(3), 233–246.
Higgins, T. (2016). Tesla, Mobileye accelerate war of words over autopilot. Wall
Street Journal, September 17.
Hunt, S.D. & Nevin, J.R. (1974). Power in a Channel of Distribution: Sources and
Consequences. Journal of Marketing Research, 11(2), 186–193.
Huo, B., Flynn, B.B., & Zhao, X. (2017). Supply Chain Power Configurations and
their Relationship with Performance. Journal of Supply Chain Management,
53(2), 88–111.
Janowicz-Panjaitan M. & Krishnan R. (2009). Measures for Dealing with
Competence and Integrity Violations of Interorganizational Trust at the
Corporate And Operating Levels of Organizational Hierarchy. Journal of
Management Studies, 46, 245–268.
Jap, S. D., & Ganesan, S. (2000). Control Mechanisms and the Relationship Life
Cycle: Implications for Safeguarding Specific Investments and Developing
Commitment. Journal of Marketing Research, 37(2), 227–245.
Johnsen, R.E., & Ford, D. (2008). Exploring the Concept of Asymmetry: A
Typology for Analysing Customer–Supplier Relationships. Industrial
Marketing Management, 37(4), 471–483.
Jones, M.A., Mothersbaugh, D.L., & Beatty, S.E. (2002). Why Customers Stay:
Measuring the Underlying Dimensions of Services Switching Costs and
Managing their Differential Strategic Outcomes. Journal of Business
Research, 55(6), 441–450.
Kaufmann, L., Esslinger, J., & Carter, C.R. (2018). Toward Relationship
Resilience: Managing Buyer-Induced Breaches of Psychological Contracts
during Joint Buyer-Supplier Projects. Journal of Supply Chain Management,
54(4), 62–85.
Kim, H., Hur, D., & Schoenherr, T. (2015). When Buyer-Driven Knowledge
Transfer Activities Really Work: A Motivation–Opportunity–Ability
Perspective. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 51(3), 33-60.
Kim, P.H., Ferrin, D.L., Cooper, C.D., & Dirks, K.T. (2004). Removing the Shadow
Of Suspicion: The Effects of Apology versus Denial for Repairing
Competence- versus Integrity-Based Trust Violations. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 89(1), 104–118.
55

Kim, P.H., Dirks, K.T., Cooper, C.D., & Ferrin, D.L (2006). When More Blame is
Better than Less: The Implications of Internal vs. External Attributions for
the Repair of Trust after a Competence- vs. Integrity-Based Trust Violation.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 99(1), 49–65.
Koufteros, X.A., Cheng, T.C.E., & Lai, K. (2007). ‘‘Black-box’’ and ‘‘Gray-box’’
Supplier Integration in Product Development: Antecedents, Consequences
and the Moderating Role of Firm Size. Journal of Operations Management,
25, 847-870.
Kumar, N., Scheer., L.K., & Steenkamp, J.E.M. (1995). The Effects of Perceived
Interdependence on Dealer Attitudes. Journal of Marketing Research,
August, 348-356.
Larson, P.D., Carr, P., & Dhariwal, K.S. (2005). SCM Involving Small Versus Large
Suppliers: Relational Exchange and Electronic Communication Media.
Journal of Supply Chain Management, 41(1), 18-29.
Lee, S., & Klassen, R.D. (2008). Drivers and Enablers That Foster Environmental
Management Capabilities in Small- and Medium-Sized Suppliers in Supply
Chains. Production and Operations Management, 17(6), 573-586.
Lee, C., & Johnsen, R.E. (2012). Asymmetric Customer–supplier Relationship
Development in Taiwanese Electronics Firms. Industrial marketing
Management, 41(4), 692–705.
Leung, W.S., Li, J., & Sun, J. (2020). Labor Unionization and Supply-Chain
Partners’ Performance. Production and Operations Management, 29(5),
1325-1353.
Li, S., Madhok, A., Plaschka, G., & Verma, R. (2006). Supplier-Switching Inertia
and Competitive Asymmetry: A Demand-Side Perspective. Decision
Sciences, 37(4). 547-576.
Lumineau, F., Eckerd, S., Handley, S. (2015). Inter-organizational Conflicts:
Research Overview, Challenges, and Opportunities. Journal of Strategic
Contracting and Negotiation, 1(1), 42–64.
Lumineau, F., & Malhotra, D. (2011). Shadow of the contract: How contract
structure shapes interfirm dispute resolution. Strategic Management
Journal, 32, 532–555.
Maloni, M., & Benton, W.C. (2000). Power Influences in the Supply Chain. Journal
Of Business Logistics, 21, 49–73.
56

Mayer, R.C., Davis, J.H., & Schoorman, F.D. (1995). An Integrative Model of
Organizational Trust. Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 709–734.
Mentzer, J.T., DeWitt, W., Keebler, J.S., Min, S., Nix, N.W., Smith, C.D., &
Zacharia, Z.G. (2001). Defining Supply Chain Management. Journal of
Business Logistics, 22(2), 1–25.
Mir, S., Aloysius, J.A., & Eckerd, S. (2017). Understanding Supplier Switching
Behavior: The Role of Psychological Contracts in a Competitive Setting.
Journal of Supply Chain Management, 53(3), 3–18.
Morgan, R.M., & Hunt, S.D. (1994). The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship
Marketing. Journal of marketing, 58(3), 20–38.
Nassimbeni, G. (2003). Local Manufacturing Systems and Global Economy:
Are They Compatible? The Case of the Italian Eyewear District. Journal of
Operations Management, 21, 151-171.
Nikoofal, M.E., & Gumus, M. (2018). Quality at the Source or at the End? Managing
Supplier Quality Under Information Asymmetry. Manufacturing and Service
Operations Management, 20(3), 498-516.
Nyaga, G.N., Lynch, D.F., Marshall, D., & Ambrose, E. (2013). Power Asymmetry,
Adaptation and Collaboration in Dyadic Relationships Involving a Powerful
Partner. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 49(3), 42-65.
Ozer, O., & Raz, G. (2011). Supply Chain Sourcing Under Asymmetric Information.
Production and Operations Management, 20(1), 92-115.
Paolacci, G. & Chandler, J. (2014) Inside the Turk: Understanding Mechanical Turk
as a Participant Pool.” Current directions in psychological science: a journal
of the American Psychological Society, 23(3), 184–188.
Pearson, J.N., & Ellram, L.M. (1995). Supplier Selection and Evaluation in Small
versus Large Electronics Firms. Journal of Small Business Management,
33(4), 53–65.
Perdue, B.C. & Summers, J.O. (1986). Checking the Success of Manipulations in
Marketing Experiments. Journal of Marketing Research, 23(4), 317–326.
Podsakoff, P.M., MacKenzie, S.B., Lee, J., & Podsakoff, N.P. (2003). Common
Method Biases in Behavioral Research: A Critical Review of the Literature
and Recommended Remedies. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88(5), 879–
903.
57

Porter, C. O., Outlaw, R., Gale, J. P., & Cho, T. S. (2019). The use of online panel
data in management research: A review and recommendations. Journal of
Management, 45(1), 319–344.
Raven, B.H., Kruglanski, A.W. (1970). Conflict and Power. In: Swingle, P. (Ed.),
The Structure of Conflict. Academic Press, New York, 69–109.
Reeder, G.D., & Brewer, M.B. (1979). A Schematic Model of Dispositional
Attribution in Interpersonal Perception. Psychological Review, 86, 61–79.
Reimann, F., & Ketchen, D.J. (2017). Power in Supply Chain Management. Journal
of Supply Chain Management, 53(2), 3–9.
Reimann, F., Kosmol, T., & Kaufmann, L. (2017). Responses to Supplier-Induced
Disruptions: A Fuzzy-Set Analysis. Journal of Supply Chain Management,
53(4), 37–66.
Rungtusanatham, M., Wallin, C., & Eckerd, S. (2011). The Vignette in a Scenario
Based Role-Playing Experiment. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 47,
9–16.
Schoenherr, T., Griffith, D.A., & Chandra, A. (2014). Knowledge Management in
Supply Chains: The Role of Explicit and Tacit Knowledge. Journal of
Business Logistics, 35(2), 121-135.
Sharpe Wessling, K., Huber, J., & Netzer, O. (2017). MTurk character
misrepresentation: Assessment and solutions. Journal of Consumer
Research, 44(1), 211–230.
Soundararajan, V., & Brammer, S. (2018). Developing Country Sub-Supplier
Responses to Social Sustainability Requirements of Intermediaries:
Exploring the Influence of Framing on Fairness Perceptions and Reciprocity.
Journal of Operations Management, 58-59, 42-58.
Stauffer, D. (2003). Risk: The Weak Link in Your Supply Chain. Harvard
Management Update, 8(3), 3–5.
Thomas, R.W., & Esper, T.L. (2010). Exploring Relational Asymmetry in Supply
Chains: The Retailer's Perspective. International Journal of Physical
Distribution & Logistics Management, 40(6), 475-494.
Tomlinson, E.C., Dineen, B.R., & Lewicki, R.J. (2009). Trust Congruence among
Integrative Negotiators as A Predictor of Joint-Behavioral Outcomes.
International Journal of Conflict Management, 20(2), 173-187.
58

Touboulic, A., Chicksand, D., & Walker, H. (2014). Managing Imbalanced Supply
Chain Relationships for Sustainability: A Power Perspective. Decision
Sciences, 45(4), 577-619.
Villena, V.H., & Craighead, C.W. (2017). On the Same Page? How Asymmetric
Buyer Supplier Relationships Affect Opportunism and Performance.
Production and Operations Management, 26(3), 491–508.
Wagner, S.M. (2003). Intensity and Managerial Scope of Supplier Integration.
Journal of Supply Chain Management, 39(3), 4-15.
Wakabayashi, D., & Luk, L. (2015). Apple watch: Faulty taptic engine slows rollout.
Wall Street Journal, April 30.
Wang, Q., Craighead, C.W., & Li, J.J. (2014). Justice Served: Mitigating Damaged
Trust Stemming from Supply Chain Disruptions. Journal of Operations
Management, 32(6), 374–386.
Wang, Y., & Gerchak, Y. (2003). Capacity Games in Assembly Systems with
Uncertain Demand. Manufacturing and Service Operations Management,
5(3), 252-267.
Weiss, A.M., & Anderson, E. (1992). Converting from Independent to Employee
Salesforces: The Role of Perceived Switching Costs. Journal of Marketing
Research, 29(1), 101–115.
Whitten, D., & Wakefield, R.L. (2006). Measuring Switching Costs in IT
Outsourcing Services.” Journal of Strategic Information Systems, 15(3),
219–248.
Wu, M., Weng, Y., & Huang, I. (2012). A Study of Supply Chain Partnerships Based
on the Commitment-Trust Theory.” Asia Pacific Journal of Marketing and
Logistics, 24(4), 690–707.
Zhao, X., Huo, B., Flynn, B.B., & Yeung, J.H.Y. (2008). The Impact of Power and
Relationship Commitment on the Integration Between Manufacturers and
Customers in a Supply Chain. Journal of Operations Management, 26(3),
368–388.

59

APPENDICES
Figure 1
Conceptual Framework

Table 1
Key Constructs Definitions
Construct
Supplier size

•

Disruption Type

•
•

Commitment

•

Mediated power

•
•

Definitions
Number of employees of the suppliers
Integrity: suppliers breaching values,
principles, social norms
Competence: supplier's lack of
knowledge and technical skills
Enduring desire to maintain the
relationship
Using extrinsic motivation to exert
influence on the target party
Collaborative use of individual bases:
coercive, reward, legal legitimate

Resources
U.S. Small Business
Administration
(Kim, Dirks, Coopers, & Ferrin,
2004)

Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987;
Morgan & Hunt, 1994
Benton & Maloni, 2005
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Mean

Std
Dev

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

[1] Supplier size

.48

.50

1.00

[2] Disruption type
(1=integrity)
[3] Commitment

Manipulated

.06

1.00

4.59

1.63

.21**

-.11

1.00

[4] Reward

4.65

1.81

.21**

.02

.58**

.55**

[5] Monitor

5.49

1.19

.02

.12

.22

.16**

1.00

[6] Coercive

5.49

1.21

.02

.13*

.03

.04

.11

1.00

[7] Gender

1.66

.48

.17**

.07

.13*

.12*

-.02

.03

1.00

[8] Age

35.51

10.42

-.05

-.05

-.03

-.01

.08

.14*

-.17**

1.00

[9] Work experience

10.45

8.91

-.18**

.03

-.36**

-.33**

.02

.06

-.14*

.68**

1.00

[10] Education

4.04

.78

.07

-.14*

.36**

.32**

.04

.08

.02

-.00

-.26**

[10]

1.00

Note:
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.005 level (2-tailed).

Table 3
Linear Regression Results
DV:
Mediated
power
5.02(.08)

pvalue

DV:
Reward

pvalue

DV:
Monitor

pvalue

DV:
Coercive

p-value

.000

4.15(.16)

.000

5.45(.11)

.000

5.46(.11)

.000

.29(.12)

.017

.85(.24)

.000

.04(.16)

.807

-.02(.16)

.921

5.76
.017
12.81
(1,228)
(1,228)
R2
.03
.05
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses.

.000

.06
(1,228)
.00

.807

.10
(1,228)
.00

.921

Constant
Large buyer/
large supplier (1)
F-value (df)

Table 4
Linear Regression Results
Model c
DV:
Commitment

pvalue

Constant

4.73(.16)

.000

Model d
DV:
Mediated
power
5.06(.09)

Integrity
disruption (1)
F-value (df)

-.49(.22)

.026

pvalue

DV:
Reward

pvalue

DV:
Monitor

DV:
Coercive

pvalue

5.32(.12)

pvalu
e
.000

.000

4.54(.18)

.000

5.31(.12)

.000

.17(.12)

.160

.01(.24)

.970

.26(.16)

.101

.25(.16)

.128

5.02
.026
1.99
(1,228)
(1,228)
R2
.02
.01
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses.

.160

.00
(1,228)
.00

.970

2.71
(1,228)
.01

.101

2.33
(1,228)
.01

.128
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Table 5
PROCESS Model 1 Regression Results
Model e
DV:
Commitment

pvalue

Constant

4.41(.21)

.000

Model f
DV:
Mediated
power
5.02(.08)

Large buyer/
large supplier
(1)
Integrity
disruption (1)

.71(.31)

.024

-.54(.28)

Supplier
size*disruption
type
F-value (df)

.08(.42)

pvalue

DV:
Reward

pvalue

DV:
Monitor

DV:
Coercive

pvalue

5.28(.16)

pvalu
e
.000

.000

4.31(.23)

.000

5.31(.16)

.000

.21(.18)

.238

.52(.35)

.140

.11(.24)

.650

.01(.24)

.971

.060

.10(.16)

.540

-.30(.32)

.362

.32(.22)

.136

.27(.22)

.215

.858

.13(.24)

.585

.60(.48)

.209

-.14(.32)

.660

-.06(.32)

.853

6.02
.000
2.62
(3,226)
(3,226)
R2
.07
.03
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses.

.051

4.79
(3,226)
.06

.003

.97
(3,226)
.01

.407

.78
(3,226)
.01

.502

Table 6
Overview of Representative Papers about Size Asymmetry in
BSRs
Authors,
Year

Journal

Supplier
size

Buyer
size

Size
measure

Touboulic,
Chicksand,
& Walker,
2014

DS

Small
and
Medium

Large

Schoenherr
,Griffith, &
Chandra,
2014
Kim, Hur, &
Schoenherr
, 2015

JBL

Small
and
Medium

Small &
Medium

# of
employees
and
annual
turnover
# of
employees

JSCM

Small
and
Medium

Large

Larson,
Carr, &
Dhariwa,
2005

JSCM

Small vs.
Large

Wagner,
2003

JSCM

Avittathur &
Swamidass
, 2007

JOM

Small

Cao &
Zhang,
2011

JOM

Small,
Medium,
and
Large

Large

Large

Natural
logarithm
of the # of
employees
# of
employees

Theoretical
Lens /
Literature
Bases
Power, RDT

Role of Firm Size

Single-case study on a
power imbalance’s
effect on supplier
sustainability adoption

Context setting (i.e.,
firm size pre-selected
or pre-determined but
not analyzed in the
paper)
Controlled for firm
size, not significant

195 surveys on SC
knowledge
management
Motivation–
Opportunity–
Ability (MOA)
Relational
Exchange

Natural
logarithm
of the
firms’
annual
sales
Revenue

# of
employees

Context

137 surveys on the
effectiveness of buyerdriven knowledgetransfer activities
Literature review and
183 surveys

173 surveys on supplier
integration

TCE, RBV,
Relational
View,

26 surveys about the
flexibility of
manufacturers and
their small suppliers
Web-survey of U.S.
manufacturing firms
conducted

Controlled for buyer
firm size, significantly
improved the model
Main effect: the
differences in
relational exchange
are due to supplier
size.
Main effect: firm size
positively related to
supplier integration
efforts, not significant
(only large firms
included)
Context setting:
profitability associated
with small supplier’s
flexibility
Moderation effect of
firm size on the
relationships among
supply chain
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Extended
RBV

Hartmann &
Moeller,
2014

JOM

Small
and large

# of
employees

Hendricks &
Singhal,
2001

JOM

Small vs.
Large

Median
sales

Koufteros,
Cheng, &
Lai, 2007

JOM

Small vs.
Large

# of
employees

Nassimbeni
, 2003

JOM

Small

Small

Large

Large

Attribution
Theory

Social
Network
Theory

# of
employees

# of
employees

Vignette-based
experiments and
surveys on
responsibility attribution
for unsustainable
supplier behavior
435 quality award
winners are
investigated in the
effectiveness of total
quality management
(TQM)
Firm size’s moderating
role

Interviews with 5
buyers and 49 surveys
from suppliers

Soundarara
jana &
Brammer,
2018

JOM

Wang &
Gerchak,
2003

MSOM

Small
and
Large

Boyer &
Olson,
2002

POM

Large

Chuang,
Oliva, &
Heim, 2019

POM

Devalkar &
Krishnan,
2019
Lee &
Klassen,
2008

POM

Small

Large

POM

Small
and
Medium

Large

# of
employees
and
annual
sales

Trade credit’s role in
mitigating supply chain
moral hazard
Case studies about
factors that improve
environmental
capabilities in SME
over time

Leung, Li, &
Sun, 2020

POM

Small

Large

Mean total
assets

Labor unions’
bargaining power

Small
and
Large
(Asymmetry
Small

Capacity

Small
vs.
Large

# of
employees

Theory of
Bounded
Self-interest

Modelling

# of
employees

Microeconomic
Theory
Modelling

A longitudinal multiple
case study about subsupplier responses to
social sustainability
requirements of
intermediaries

Centralized and
decentralized
equilibrium capacities
under game settings
416 surveys from the
small customers
revealing the buyersupplier relationships
Firm size as a
moderator in inventory
leanness and efficiency

collaboration,
collaborative
advantage,
and firm performance
Controlled for firm
size, not significant

Main effect:
significantly and
negatively associated
with a financial
performance from
TQM
Moderation effect:
significant negative
effect of small firms
on black-box
integration but no
effect of large firms
Controlled for firm
size, not significant
Differences in
opportunities are
observed.
Large suppliers are
favored in new
technologies and the
global economy.
Context setting: small
sub-supplies selected
The study focuses on
the influence of
framing social
sustainability
requirements on small
sub-supplier
behaviors.
Main effect:
decentralized channel
performance
associated with firm
size
Context setting

Moderation effect on
inventory leanness
and operational
efficiency
Context setting

Context setting

Controlled for supplier
firm’s size, statistically
significant
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Ozer &
Raz, 2011

POM

Small vs.
Large

Villena &
Craighead,
2017

POM

Small
and
Large

Modelling

Small
and
Large
(Asymmetry

Annual
sales
(sales’
logarithmic
value)

TCE and
RDT

SC sourcing contracts
under information
asymmetry, dealing
with different-sized
suppliers
Surveys and archival
from 106 buying firms

Main effect:
buyers’ contracting
decisions

Main effect: perceived
opportunism and
performance

Footnote: Decision Sciences (DS), Journal of Business Logistics (JBL), Journal of Supply Chain Management
(JSCM), Journal of Operations Management (JOM), Management Science (MS), Manufacturing & Service
Operations Management (MSOM), and Production & Operations Management (POM).
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Appendix A
Treatment Vignettes
Scenario (Introduction)
Imagine you work as a buyer for a large company, which has more than 10,000
employees. The next pages will walk you through a business situation with one of
your suppliers.
Scenario (Large vs. Small supplier)
Large Supplier
You have a large supplier who has more than 10,000 employees. In the past, this
supplier has been reliable and competent. The products and services this supplier
provides could be purchased from alternative suppliers that have already been
approved.
Small Supplier
You have a small supplier who has less than 50 employees. In the past, this
supplier has been reliable and competent. The products and services this supplier
provides could be purchased from alternative suppliers that have already been
approved.
Scenario (Competence vs. Integrity disruption)
Competence Disruption
Suppose the following situation has unfolded between you and the existing
supplier. Recently, this supplier shipped a batch of defective products to your plant,
resulting in your firm experiencing delays to your customers. It is the first time
within the contractual history that this supplier created such an issue. The cause
of this failure was traced back to the supplier's incorporation of raw materials that
did not meet your specifications for the product. It has been conclusively
determined that the supplier purchased lower-quality materials due to a lack of
knowledge and expertise. Please answer the following questions regarding this
issue.
Integrity Disruption
Suppose the following situation has unfolded between you and the existing
supplier. Recently, this supplier shipped a batch of defective products to your plant,
resulting in your firm experiencing delays to your customers. It is the first time
within the contractual history that this supplier created such an issue. The cause
of this failure was traced back to the supplier's incorporation of raw materials that
did not meet your specifications for the product. It has been conclusively
determined that the supplier purchased lower-quality materials in order to inflate
their own margins by using this insufficient material. Please answer the following
questions regarding this issue.
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Appendix B
Multi- and Single- item Measures
Construct
Commitment

Items
1. We are committed to this supplier.
2. Our firm is dedicated to this supplier.
3. We are committed to the preservation of a good relationship
4. We are devoted to this supplier.

Std
Loading
0.88
0.92
0.85
0.92

Mediated Power
Reward

5. Offer rewards if this supplier does not make similar mistakes
again within the remaining contract period.
Monitor
6. Ask only that your supplier fulfill their obligation to compensate
for the costs involved strictly based on the contract.
Coercive
7. Institute penalties against this supplier if they make similar
mistakes again within the remaining contract period.
Measures of overall model fit: χ2/df =7.30; RMSEA=0.10, 90% CI [0.051, 0.159]; SRMR = 0.01; CFI = 0.99;
TLI = 0.98.
Note:
1. The anchor for each item is : 1 = Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly agree.
2. All factor loadings are significant at p < 0.001.
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CHAPTER III – CONCLUSION
This dissertation contains two essays investigating the inter-organizational
relationship. The purpose of this dissertation is to better understand the decisionmaking in buyer-supplier relationships contingent on various circumstances. Essay
1’s findings enrich our understanding of perceptions of buyers dealing with large
and small suppliers in a supplier-induced disruption. Buyers prefer to use mediated
power with large suppliers than with small ones. This positive connection between
the supplier’s firm size and the buyer’s preference in resolving the disruption is
mediated by the buyer's commitment to the supplier. In addition, the type of
disruption plays critical roles in affecting buyers’ perceptions directly and
influencing the supplier size’s effectiveness. In response to the discussion of
buyers’ different reactions to the large and small suppliers in Essay 1, Essay 2
provides an overview of the literature about buyer-supplier relationships in a size
asymmetric context. Synthesizing the literature, Essay 2 identifies the challenges
in the size asymmetry literature and highlights the research opportunities
presented in a research agenda. Evidence of the firm size in supplier-induced
disruptions is provided in Essay 1, and a literature overview along with challenges
and opportunities related to size asymmetry are offered for buyer-supplier
relationship scholars. The following must be addressed: gaps in the studies of size
asymmetry in a non-disruptive context and size asymmetry in a disrupted supply
chain.
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